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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 7, 1990, the Florida Securities and Investor Protection
Act, chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes,' was revised and re-enacted,2
* Professor of Legal Research and Writing, Nova University, Shepard Broad
Law Center. J.D., Catholic University of America, 1984; A.B., College of the Holy
Cross, 1981. Professor Murtaugh practiced securities law in Houston, Texas and New
York, New York, prior to joining the Law Center faculty.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.011 - .32 (1987) (the "Act"), amended by 1990 Fla. Laws
362 ("Chapter 517").
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effective October 1, 1990, to include developments in securities regula-
tion that have occurred since the last major revision of the Florida Blue
Sky Law' in 1986.' The broadly based revisions include: definitional
changes;5 limitations on and expansions of the registration require-
ments and exemptions therefrom for certain securities and individuals
selling securities;6 supplementary requirements for the registration of
securities industry professionals (broker-dealers and investment advi-
sors);" and additional grounds for the revocation, denial or suspension
of the registration of securities and of securities industry professionals.,
The most controversial alteration to the Act was the conversion of
a simple three-letter word "may," to a not-so-simple five letter word
"shall." Section 517.122, the Act's provision regarding the arbitration
of disputes between securities professionals and their customers,9 origi-
nally provided that Florida registered broker-dealers "may provide to
an aggrieved party the option of having arbitration before . .. the
American Arbitration Association."'" The 1990 amendments changed
2. The Act was scheduled for repeal on October 1, 1990 by 1981 Fla. Laws 318
and was scheduled for review prior to repeal pursuant to the Florida Regulatory Sunset
Act, FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (1989).
3. The term "Blue Sky Law" refers to state laws that regulate, inter alia, the
sale and registration of securities. The term originated in 1911 in connection with the
enactment by the State of Kansas of the first law governing the sale of securities.
Kansas had been a stronghold of the Populist philosophy [in an] era
when an 'Agrarian West' was bled by a 'Moneyed East.' Indeed, it was in
Kansas, apparently, that the term 'blue sky law' first came into general use
to describe legislation aimed at promoters who 'would sell building lots in
the blue sky in fee simple'.
L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 8 (1983) (citing Mulvey, Blue
Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. T. 37 (1916)).
4. On October 1, 1986, Florida enacted the Securities Industries Standards Act,
1986 Fla. Laws 85, that amended sections of and created provisions for the Act. See
infra note 37 and accompanying text.
5. H.B. 3429, 11th Leg., § 1 (1990) (the "Bill").
6. Id. at §§ 2-4.
7. Id. at §§ 6, 7.
8. Id. at §§ 5, 12.
9. Id. at § 8.
10. The full text of section 517.122 of the Act prior to its amendment by 1990
Fla. Laws 362 read:
Arbitration. Any agreement to provide services that are covere=d by this
chapter, entered into after January 1, 1987, by a person required to regis-
ter under this chapter, for arbitration of disputes arising under the agree-
ment may provide to an aggrieved party the option of having arbitration
before and pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
[Vol. 15
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the permissive to the mandatory: Florida registered broker-dealers
"shall provide . .. the option of having arbitration before .. . the
American Arbitration Association or other independent nonindustry ar-
bitration forum .... "I'
On October 3, 1990, three days after the amended Act became
effective, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida ruled that section 517.122 was unconstitutional. In Securities
Industry Association v. Lewis, 2 the Southern District found that the
Florida legislature's imposition of a required term in arbitration agree-
ments between broker-dealers and their customers "violates the protec-
tions embodied in [the Federal Arbitration Act], and therefore [was
preempted, pursuant to] the Supremacy Clause [of the United States
Constitution] ."1
This article will provide a brief historical analysis of the evolution
of the Florida Blue Sky Law and discuss the 1990 legislative changes
to that law. The article will then focus on the development of the juris-
prudence governing the arbitration of securities disputes; the issue of
state laws controlling arbitration -agreements under the potential he-
gemony of the Federal Arbitration Act; the Supremacy Clause and the
preemption doctrine; and the Lewis decision. It will conclude that al-
though the Lewis court's decision was not capricious, it was not
compelled.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FLORIDA'S BLUE SKY
LAW
"In Florida, securities regulation has developed dramatically over
the years with the philosophy of regulation shifting from registration of
FLA. STAT. § 517.122 (1987), amended by 1986 Fla. Laws 85.
11. The full text of section 517.122 of the Act after its amendment by 1990 Fla.
Laws 362 read:
Arbitration. Any agreement to provide services that are covered by this
chapter, entered into after October 1, 1990, by a person required to regis-
ter under this chapter, for arbitration of disputes arising under the agree-
ment shall provide to an aggrieved party the option of having arbitration
before and pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association
or other independent nonindustry arbitration forum as well as any industry
forum.
FLA. STAT. § 517.122 (1987), amended by 1990 Fla. Laws 362.
12. 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
13. Id. at 208.
1991]
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the securities to protecting investors from fraudulent practices."1 In
1913, Florida passed its first Blue Sky Law and embarked upon regu-
lating the "merit" of an offering of securities.' 5 Merit regulation re-
quires that the state make a substantive review of an offering and inde-
pendently determine its fairness. In order to obtain registration of its
offering, the issuer must show that the issue is "fair, just and equita-
ble" to potential investors.1 6
This form of regulation contrasts with the "full and fair disclo-
sure" philosophy on which the federal securities laws are premised.17
Under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"),18 issues of finan-
cial soundness, insufficient earnings, offering price, inequitable voting
rights and excessive commissions or underwriting and selling expenses
will not prevent an offering from going forward, so long as the issuer
makes full disclosure of any such condition. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission 19 has stated:
In contrast to some of the State officials and commissions, operat-
ing under state "Blue-Sky" laws that authorize them to pass upon
the merits of securities registered with them, it is not this Commis-
sion's function under the Securities Act to approve or disapprove
securities and the statute specifically makes it unlawful to represent
that the Commission has passed upon the merits of any security, or
14. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 3429, 11 th
Leg. § 1 (1990) (FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS).
15. COMPTROLLER'S TASK FORCE ON SECURITIES REGULATION REPORT, H.B.
644, 9th Leg., lst.Sess., at 67 (1986) (TASK FORCE REPORT).
16. See Ex Parte Taylor, 68 Fla. 61, 71, 66 So. 292, 295 (1914) (quoting Chap-
ter 6422, acts of 1913). For commentaries on merit regulation by both proponents and
opponents, see Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of
Securities Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41
Bus. LAW 785 (1986); Campbell, An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regu-
lation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553 (1985); Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the
Merit Requirements, 1976 WIs. L. REV. 79 (1976); Hueni, Application of Merit Re-
quirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417 (1969); Mofsky &
Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 367 (19"7); Tyler, More
About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 (1982); Warren, Reflections on Dual
Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C.L. REv.1 495 (1984).
17. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 36.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1990).
19. The Securities and Exchange Commission is the federal agency charged with
the responsibility of administering the federal securities laws. See Securities and Ex-
change Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1990).
[Vol. 15
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given approval to it.2"
One authority on the regulation of securities has noted colorfully:
"Congress did not take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to
make a fool of himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others from
making a fool of him." 21
Partially in response to the stock market crash of 1929, the Flor-
ida legislature enacted the Florida Sale of Securities Act in 193 1.22
Modeled on the Uniform Sale of Securities Act23 adopted by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association, this Act created the Florida Securities
Commission consisting of the Comptroller, the Treasurer and the At-
torney General. 4 The state's regulatory scheme was broadened with
the requirement of registration of secondary sales of securities and the
expansion of requirements for registering primary offerings.
2 5
The next major revision of Florida's Blue Sky Law took place
forty-seven years later with the adoption of the Florida Sale of Securi-
ties Act in 1978.21 "The Act was characterized by a retreat from the
merit review philosophy and an increased emphasis on anti-fraud en-
forcement. The most significant change in the law was the exemption
from merit review of any security registered with the federal govern-
20. In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648, 656 (1945) (citations
omitted).
21. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 36. The "Dean of American securities law"
continues:
As the Supreme Court has ... put it, the SEC statutes embrace a "fun-
damental purpose. . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of busi-
ness ethics in the securities industry . . . ." It must not be thought, how-
ever, that Disclosure and Merit are two gods that sit on separate but equal
thrones. On the one hand [a state blue sky law, in particular, the Uniform
Securities Act] has a disclosure component, and most states today require
the delivery of a prospectus. On the other hand, the indirect regulatory
effect of a policed system of full and fair disclosure should not be underes-
timated: people who are forced to undress in public will presumably pay
attention to their figures.
Id. (citations omitted.)
22. 1931 Fla. Laws 261.
23. Uniform Sale of Securities Act (1929).
24. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id.
1991]
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ment."2  This change in philosophy apparently resulted from the Flor-
ida Law Revision Council's 1975 finding that merit review had "arbi-
trarily inhibited growth of new enterprise and created undesirable
competitive advantages for large corporations at the cost of small
firms" and could not, therefore, survive a cost-benefit analysis.2"
In 1984, the legislature revisited the Blue Sky Law, enacting the
Investor Protection Act of 1984.29 This Act expanded the Department
of Banking and Finance's 3° anti-fraud enforcement authority to offers
and sales of investments as well as securities. 3' The addition of this
unique remedial provision was a response to the increasing practice of
unscrupulous promoters situating their fraudulent investment schemes
in Florida, where they could claim that their promotions did not involve
the offering or sale of "securities. '3 2
One year later, the Florida legislature attempted once again to fine
tune its Blue Sky Law by promulgating the Securities and Investor
Protection Act, 3 the grandfather of Chapter 517. Having determined
that it had lacked necessary prescience in 197834 when it exempted
from registration all securities registered under the United States Se-
curities Act of 1933,35 the legislature substituted the requirement of
27. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 69.
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.011 - .32 (1985).
30. The Division of Securities of the Department of Banking and Finance (the
Department) was created in 1969 to succeed the Securities Commission and was placed
under the administration of the Comptroller. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at
2.
31. Id.
32. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 70. An example of the expansion of
the Department's enforcement authority by the Investor Protection Act of 1984 is the
addition of a definition of "boiler rooms" and the concurrent prohibition of their opera-
tion for the commission of investment fraud. FLA. STAT. §§ 517.021 and 517.312
(1987). Prior to the 1984 Act, the term "security" in the Florida Blue Sky Law was
often accorded a restrictive interpretation by the Florida courts. In Yeomans v. State,
452 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the court reversed the Comptrol-
ler's orders, closing thirty-two "boiler room" operations selling "filing service" con-
tracts in connection with the United States Department of Interior's oil and gas lease
lottery. The Third District held that the contracts were not securities (specifically, not
"investment contracts") as defined by the Florida Blue Sky Law.
33. The Securities and Investor Protection Act, FLA. STAT. §j; 517.011 - .32
(1985), amended by 1990 Fla. Laws 362.
34. 1978 Fla. Laws 435.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1990).
[Vol. 15
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"registration by notification" for that exemption. 6
Continuing its annual foray into revising its laws governing the
offering and sale of securities and the people and practices associated
therewith, the legislature, in 1986, amended Florida's Blue Sky Law
again with the adoption of the Securities Industry Standards Act.37
The new law was premised on recommendations of the Comptroller's
Task Force on Securities Regulation, established in 1985 to "conduct a
comprehensive review of Florida's regulation of securities and other in-
vestment transactions."' 8 The primary objective of that legislation was
to enhance anti-fraud enforcement of securities and investment
transactions. 9
This Act sought to accomplish its 'purpose through, inter alia, in-
creasing the number of types of securities offerings that can be regis-
tered in Florida only through merit registration (as opposed to notifica-
tion registration), clarifying by redefinition the term "investment,"
imposing stricter requirements on individuals registering in the state as'
broker-dealers, and strengthening the Department's enforcement
powers.40
The Florida legislature in 1986 also opted to add the simple three-
letter word "may," rather than the not-so-simple five-letter word
"shall" to the Act's provision regarding the arbitration of disputes be-
tween a broker-dealer and its customer and the option of using the
American Arbitration Association.41 Thus, the controversy between the
State and the securities industry would be avoided for four years, dur-
ing which time the industry would be allowed to bolster its arsenal of
federal court jurisprudence and dicta with which to challenge such a
36. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 70. The proliferation of offerings
of federally registered penny stocks "had not been envisioned seven years earlier when
the Florida Securities Act was passed". Id. The 1985 legislation also enhanced the
investigative authority of the Department "by providing confidentiality for examination
of books and records and strict penalties for non-compliance with investigative subpoe-
nas." Id. at 71.
37. H.B. 644, 9th Leg., Ist Sess. (1986).
38. HousE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 644, 9th
Leg., 1st Sess. (1986).
39. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15.
40. Id. For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the Securities Industry Stan-
dards Act of 1986, its background and related issues, see Cane, The Securities Indus-
try Standards Act of 1986: Significant Changes In Florida's Blue Sky Laws, 11 NOvA
L. REV. 1179 (1987).
41. FLA. STAT. § 517.122 (Supp. 1986). See supra note 10 and infra notes 146-
54 and accompanying text.
1991] 959
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mandate.
III. HOUSE BILL 3429: THE 1990 LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO
FLORIDA'S BLUE SKY LAW
A. Purpose and Scope
In addition to inspiring litigation over one of its more palpable sec-
tions, the Bill reenacted the Florida Blue Sky Law, Chapter 517 of the
Florida Statutes.42 In arguing the necessity of the Act's reinstatement,
the House Commerce Committee (the Committee) recognized that
"Florida residents are frequently the target of investment scams due to
the large pool of retirement money and the population growth rate" of
the state.43 The Committee asserted:
Without the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, and
the rules promulgated thereunder, citizens of the State of Florida
would be vulnerable to a vast array of fraudulent schemes and the
State would be a haven for unscrupulous conduct within the securi-
-ties and investment advisory industry. The Act protects the eco-
nomic health, safety, and welfare of the investing public by estab-
lishing a method of regulating the sale of securities and
investments.4 1
Chapter 517 attempts to achieve its goals in three ways. First, it
requires the registration of securities, the purpose of which is to prevent
the offer or sale of issues that could result in fraud upon the purchaser,
unreasonable underwriting or selling expenses, or windfall profits to the
promoter or issuer at the expense of the public.45 Second, it requires
registration of persons engaged in the offer or sale of securities, thereby
attempting to assure the public that such people have at least a mini-
mal knowledge and ability to act in a fiduciary capacity, that they have
met minimal standards of financial responsibility and that unqualified
or unscrupulous persons are excluded from the business.4 6 Third, it pro-
vides penalties for persons engaging in fraudulent activity in connection
with the sale or purchase of securities or investments and gives the De-
42. See supra note 2.
43. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 3.
44. Id. at 2-3.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id.
(Vol. 15
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partment the necessary authority to enforce those punitive provisions. 47
Additionally, the Committee recognized that in the absence of a
Florida law regulating securities, only the federal securities laws would
apply, if at all, to transactions in the State. The Committee posited
that:
[F]ederal protection would be limited in both scope and availability
[to Florida residents] for three reasons: (1) federal law would only
apply to interstate commerce and not to those transactions occur-
ring strictly within Florida; (2) federal law would not be as com-
prehensive as the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act;
and (3) the resources to pursue individual investment schemes
would not be available . . . . [A]ny degree of deregulation could
result in a lessening of protection and remedies available to the
public as well as to the industry.48
Finally, the Committee argued that Chapter 517 protects persons
engaged in the securities and investment advisory business as well as
the investing public.
[Chapter 517] protect[s] the business climate in which legitimate
dealers operate by ensuring that they are all held to the following:
the same minimum level of competence; the same books and
records, and net capital requirements; and the same standards in
the way they conduct business and deal with the investing public.
These standards serve to ensure fairness in competition among per-
sons in the industry, and further protect the industry from arbi-
trary or capricious conduct by the Department. 49
The Florida Legislature agreed with the Committee's assessment
of the need for reinstating the State's Blue Sky Law, as amended by
House Bill 3249, and voted, almost unanimously, for its passage.50 The
47. Id.
48. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 3-4. The Committee continued:
"Failure to re-enact the Act would most certainly adversely affect the public [by lead-
ing] to more improper or fraudulent securities transactions. In the absence of regula-
tory authority, the Department [of Banking and Finance] would be powerless to sanc-
tion such conduct." Id.
49. Id. at 4.
50. The Senate passed the Bill by a vote of 38 to 0; the House passed it by a vote
of 110-3. Id. at 10. The legislative history of the Bill was curious:
On 4/04/90 House Bill 3429 was filed by the Commerce Committee and
Representative Ron Johnson. The bill was referred to the Appropriations
1991]
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amendments to the Act that the legislature so overwhelmingly endorsed
include changes affecting the registration of securities and exemptions
from securities registration,51 changes in the registration requirements
and exemptions from registration for securities industry personnel5" and
definitional and clarification changes. 3
B. Changes in the Registration and Exemption Therefrom of
Securities and Securities Professionals
1. Securities: Registration and Exemption
The Bill contains four significant changes regarding -the registra-
tion and exemption from registration of securities offerings under the
Florida Blue Sky Law.
First, the Act enumerates certain transactions that are exempt
from registration because of the nature of the issuer and the investors
involved in the issuer's offering. These exemptions are available in situ-
ations in which the potential for fraud and deceit are minimal, usually
because the purchaser is experienced in the investment field and has
Committee on 4/09/90 (HJ 00164), withdrawn from the Appropriations
Committee on 4/17/90 (HJ 00207) and placed on the Calendar. On 5/
02/90, the bill was placed on the Special Order Calendar and passed as
amended on 5/03/90 by a vote of 114-2 (HJ 00437). On 5/10/90 the
Senate received the bill in Messages and referred it to the Commerce
Committee (SJ 00319). On 5/23/90 the bill was withdrawn from the
Commerce Committee, substituted for CS/SB 1442 (SJ 00427) and was
passed as amended by a vote of 38-0 (SJ 00429). On 5/31/90 the House
refused to concur and requested the Senate to recede (HJ 1519). On 6/
01/90 the Senate refused to recede and requested the House to concur (SJ
01247). On 6/02/90 the House concurred and passed the bill as amended
by a vote of 110-3 (HJ 01901), and the bill was ordered enrolled.
Id. It is interesting to note that the Bill presented to Governor Martinez on June 6,
1990, became law on July 7, 1990 without his signature. Id.
51. See infra notes 54-90 and accompanying text. The FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS
advanced a different scheme organizing the Bill's changes to the Act. The Bill contains:
changes that codify the Department of Banking and Finances historical
interpretations of certain provisions of the Act, changes that update vari-
ous provisions of the law to reflect changes in corresponding federal law
and technical changes that clarify the requirements for compliance with
the Act and the meaning of certain terms.
FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 2.
52. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
962 [Vol. 15
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information available on which to base an informed investment deci-
sion.5 4 One such provision exempts from securities registration second-
ary market transactions in a security by a registered dealer.55
The Bill prohibits the use of this exemption for securities of an
issuer that previously have been denied registration by the Department
for cause. 6 This change puts the secondary market 7 on par with the
primary market 58 in Florida, and precludes an offering that would have
been denied registration from infiltrating the State'sborders in a sec-
ondary market transaction through a Florida registered dealer.
Second, the Bill grants the. Department the rulemaking authority
to exclude persons who sell securities in one type of exempt transaction,
the non-public ("private placement") or limited offering that the De-
partment has made exempt by rule,59 from the registration require-
54. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5.
55. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(17)(a) (1987).
56. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 3. "Cause" exists when:
(a) The issuer is insolvent;
(b) The issuer or any controlling person has violated any provision of
[Chapter 517] or any rule made hereunder or any order of the Department
of which such issuer has notice;
(c) The issuer or any controlling person has been or is engaged or is
about to engage in fraudulent transactions;
(d) The issuer or any controlling person is in any other way dishonest
or has made any fraudulent representations or failed to disclose any mate-
rial information in any prospectus or in any circular or other literature
that has been distributed concerning the issuer or its securities; or
(e) The terms of the offer or sale of such securities under [the merit
registration provision] would not be fair, just, or equitable.
FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1990).
57. The sale of a security by the buyer from the issuer in the primary market (in
the primary distribution of that security) to another purchaser at a mutually agreed
upon price is a sale in the secondary market (a secondary market transaction). The
proceeds of this transaction accrue to the first buyer, not to the issuer. This sale may
take place privately, through a broker-dealer or over a national securities exchabge. R.
TEWELES & E. BRADLEY, THE STOCK MARKET 3 (5th ed. 1987).
58. The initial sale of securities is from the issuing entity to the investor in a
primary transaction in the "primary market," with the sale proceeds flowing to the
issuer. Id.
59. FLA. STAT. § 517.061(18)(c) gives the Department the authority to exempt,
by rule, transactions from the Act's registration requirements. In relevant part, that
section states:
[T]ransactions defined by rules as transactions exempted from the re-
gistration provisions of [the Act], which rules the department may . . .
adopt . . . after a finding . . . that the application of the [Act's registra-
1991]
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ments for "dealers." 60 Regulation D, the federal regulation containing
the rules under which such offerings are exempt from federal securities
registration, allows the issuer (and its representatives) to offer and sell
its securities (in a regulated manner) without registering as a dealer."
The adoption of such a rule by the Department would coordinate fur-
ther the Florida exemption with the federal exemption, thereby simpli-
fying the process and decreasing the expense to an issuer desiring to
make a private placement or limited offering in Florida.62
Third, the Department also was provided authority to exempt from
the Act's "laborious merit review process"6 3 securities that, although
marketed at five dollars or less per share, are nevertheless of high in-
vestment quality. 4 Section 517.082 of the Act exempts from merit re-
tion] provisions ... to a particular transaction is not necessary in the pub-
lic interest and for the protection of investors because of the small dollar
amount of securities involved or the limited character of the offering [are
so exempted].
FLA. STAr. § 517.061(18)(c) (1987), amended by 1990 Fla. Laws 362.
60. "Dealer" includes any of the following:
1. Any person, other than an associated person registered under this chap-
ter, who engages, either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly, as
broker or principal in the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise
dealing or trading in securities issued by another person.
2. Any issuer who through persons directly compensated or controlled by
the issuer engages, either for all or part of his time, directly or indirectly,
in the business of offering or selling securities which are issued or are pro-
posed to be issued by the issuer.
FLA. STAT. § 517.021(6)(a) (1990).
61. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 501 - 508 (1990).
62. An applicant for registration as a dealer must pay an assessment fee of $200.
See FLA. STAT. § 517.12(10) (1990).
Adopting such a rule would also bring the Department's small-off-.ring exemption
into parallel with the statutory limited offering exemption. Persons associated with an
issuer that makes an offering pursuant to section 517.061(11) (the statutory "private
placement") are excluded from the statutory definition of "dealer." See FLA. STAT. §
517.021(6)(b)(6) (1990).
It must be noted that the Department has not acted under its grant of authority to
adopt rules creating transaction exemptions for small or limited offerings in addition to
those provided in Chapter 517.
63. See FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5.
64. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 4. The legislature did not impose any standard
with which the Department must abide in promulgating such a rule. The FINAL STAFF
ANALYSIS explains that because
this is an area where there is a potential for fraud, such as with stock
priced at less than $5 (or 'penny stock'), no substantive statutory standard
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gistration all securities "offered and sold pursuant to a registration
statement filed under the Securities Act of 1933, ' '65 but requires the
issuers of those offerings to register them for sale in the State of Flor-
ida pursuant to "notification." Notification registration, "a cursory pro-
cess, ' 66 requires the issuer to notify the Department of its intention to
make the offering, of its name and address of the title of the securities
that will be offered and sold, and to file with the Department a consent
to service and copies of documents filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.6
The 1986 amendments to the Act 8 limited the use of notification
registration to issuers whose securities at the time of effectiveness with
the Securities and Exchange Commission are offered at a price of more
than five dollars per share or unit, unless the securities have been listed
or approved for listing on a national securities exchange or NAS-
DAQ.6" This limitation was added because of the Task Force's7" con-
is set for the Department to issue such rules as a standard may only en-
courage fraudulent obtainment of any exemption which may be set by
rule.
FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5-6.
65. See supra note 1.
66. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5.
67. Section 517.082 also requires the payment of a $1,000 nonrefundable fee. A
registration by notification becomes effective upon effectiveness of the registration
statement under the Securities Act of 1933. See supra note 1.
68. See supra note 4; see also Cane, supra note 40, for a detailed analysis and
explanation of this "limited return to merit regulation."
69. FLA. STAT. § 517.082(3) (1987). The full text of the then-new subsection 3
provided:
Except for securities offered or sold pursuant to a registration statement
filed under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the provisions of this
section may not be used to register securities if the offering price at the
time of effectiveness with the Securities and Exchange Commission is $5
or less per share or per unit, unless such securities are listed or designated,
or approved for listing or designation upon notice of issuance, on a stock
exchange registered pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or on
the National Association of Securities Dealers' Automated Quotation
(NASDAQ) System, or unless such securities are of the same issuer and
of senior or substantially equal rank to securities so listed or designated.
Id. The stock exchanges referred to include the New York Stock Exchange, the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange and the regional exchanges, such as the Philadelphia and Pacific
Stock Exchanges.
NASDAQ is the computerized price quotation system established by the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in 1971.
The system displays price quotations that are continuously updated on a
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cern over the proliferation of offerings of "penny stocks," shares of
stock that are sold for nominal amounts.71 The Task Force Report
stated: "These are often highly speculative, undercapitalized offerings
and usually sold in states where the registration standards provide for
no merit review. Florida has a significant number of these questionable
investment opportunities due to the current absence of review for all
federally-registered offerings. '"72
But the Task Force was hesitant in re-imposing 73 a .nerit review
provision for securities registration. As former Florida Governor Rubin
Askew, the Chairman of the Task Force, stated: "[W]e are looking for
a balance . . . something that is workable and something that will al-
low the market to operate fairly and at the same time reduce the inci-
dence of people being taken on outright fraudulent schemes." 74 The
balance that was struck in 1986 was tilted in 1990. In addition to au-
thorizing the Department to exempt from merit review securities of
high investment quality, the Bill added to the Act's listing of exclusions
from the required merit review of securities marketed at five dollars or
less units of limited partnership interest.7 5
A unit of limited partnership interest, in its attributes as a secur-
ity7" and in the way it is regulated as a security,77 is different from the
real-time basis on computer terminals located in a subscriber's office. The
minimum qualification standards for initial inclusion of an issuer's securi-
ties in the NASDAQ system include (i) total assets of $2 million; (ii) capi-
tal and surplus of $1 million; (iii) 100,000 publicly held shares; (iv) 300
shareholders of record; and (v) two NASDAQ market makers.
NASD Manual, Sched. D 1138-41 (March 1987).
70. See supra note 15.
71. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 56. Penny stock, also known as
"cheap stock," has been the subject of heated debate between state regulators and
practitioners. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy on Cheap Stock, 1 Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 5311 - 5314 (1984); Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of
the State Regulation of Securities Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation, 10
J. CORP. L. 553 (1985).
72. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 56.
73. See supra notes 15 and 16, and accompanying text.
74. Testimony of Royce Griffin before the Task Force in Miami, Florida (Janu-
ary 13-14, 1986).
75. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 4.
76. A limited partnership interest is an "investment contract." An investment
contract involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with an expectation
of profit coming from the managerial efforts of others. S.E.C. v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293
(1946); S.E.C. v. Glen W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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common stock issued by a corporation. The primary distinction (for the
purposes of this discussion) is the illiquidity of the partnership inter-
est. 8 Units of limited partnership interest are purchased as long-term
investments because usually no active secondary market for them
exists.79
The issuing entity also is significantly different.80 The limited part-
Investment contracts are included in the definitions of a security in both Florida
law (see FLA. STAT. § 517.021 (1990)) and the federal Securities Act of 1933 (see 15
U.S.C. § 77b (1990)).
Note that, as a security, a unit of limited partnership interest shares a number of
similarities with a share of stock: they are both investment vehicles; unless an exemp-
tion exists they must be registered before being offered and sold, and the anti-fraud
rules apply to transactions in both.
For a discussion of whether every unit of limited partnership interest involves a
security, see Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-08 (7th Cir. 1978). For a discus-
sion of situations in which general partnership interests are securities, see Rivanna
Trawlers v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988); see also Chang, Meaning, Refer-
ence, and Reification in the Definition of a Security, 19 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 403
(1986); Arnold, "When is a Car a Bicycle?" And Other Riddles: The Definition of a
Security Under the Federal Securities Laws, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449 (1984-85);
Levinson, General Partnership Interests and the Securities Act of 1933: Recent Judi-
cial Developments, 10 OHto N.U.L. REV. 463 (1983); Long, Partnership, Limited
Partnership and Joint Venture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REv. 581 (1972).
77. Numerous states require that partnership offerings satisfy specific standards,
including standards of investor suitability. See, e.g., NASAA Statement of Policy, I
Blue Sky L.Rep. (CCH) Real Estate Programs, 5363, pt. III (1984). The NASD also
requires that limited partnerships satisfy certain criteria not applicable to corporate
offerings. See art. III, § 34, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH) 1
2191.
78. Hensley & Rothwell, Regulation T and Public Offerings of Limited Partner-
ships: Time for a Change, 39 Bus. LAW. 543, 544 (1984).
79. Id. Note that this is not true of "publicly traded limited partnerships" (some-
times referred to as master limited partnerships) that are exchange or NASDAQ
listed. Id.
The lack of an active secondary market is the result of restrictions imposed by
partnerships on free transferability of partnership units in order to protect the status of
the partnership as a non-taxable entity. The partnership agreement usually will pro-
hibit assignment or transfer of a unit without consent of the general partner to avoid
automatic termination of the partnership status under the Internal Revenue Code. Sec-
tion 708(b)(1) of the Code provides for automatic termination if fifty percent or more
of the capital and profit interests in a partnership are sold within a twelve-month pe-
riod. Id.
80. The traditional attributes of the partnership and corporate forms of business
organization differ in the formalities of organization, capital and credit requirements,
management and control, profits and losses, extent of liability, transferability of inter-
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nership is usually formed with a single, temporary business objective.8'
Unlike the corporation, it does not have perpetual life and its focus is
peculiarly specific.
These differences between the partnership and the corporation and
their respective securities typically result in a lower price 1.o the public
of partnership units than of new issues of corporate stock.!2 In remov-
ing partnership interests from the category of securities that must un-
dergo a merit review for registration in Florida, the legislature recog-
nized that those interests frequently are marketed at or below five
dollars without necessarily being of poor investment quality. In this im-
portant area, the regulatory balance has shifted in favor of
"[s]omething that is workable."' 3
Fourth, the Bill expands the grounds for denial, suspension or rev-
ocation of securities to include instances in which the issuer or any con-
trolling person of the issuer has failed to disclose any material informa-
tion in any prospectus, any offering circular or any other literature
concerning the issuer or its securities.8 4 Section 517.111 of the Act sets
forth the grounds for which the Department may revoke or suspend the
registration of any security registered with it, or deny any application
to register securities with it.8 5
est, continuity of existence and taxation considerations. See generally H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER. LAWS OF CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1983).
81. A limited partnership is a contractual arrangement among one or more gen-
eral partners and limited partners who aggregate their financial resources and business
expertise to accomplish a business objective. Hensley & Rothwell, supra note 78, at
557.
82. The offering price of a new issue is determined after negotiations occur be-
tween the issuer and the underwriter. The factors generally considered in those negotia-
tions in determining the offering price at which to market a new issue are: prices of
similar companies; price/earnings ratio; capitalization; projected growth; acceptability
of certain maximum prices by customers; acceptability of certain minimum prices by
the proposed syndicate; book value; percentage of the shares to be publicly offered in
relation to the shares that will be outstanding after the offering; type of security being
offered; type of company; and public confidence in the market. Kowaloff & Flood, Pric-
ing, Effectiveness, and Closing, in SECURITIES UNDERWRITING, A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 325 (1985).
83. See supra note 74 and accompanying text..
84. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 5.
85. Section 517.111, of the Florida Statutes read, prior to amendment, inter alia:
Revocation or denial of registration of securities. (1) The department may
revoke or suspend the registration of any security, or may deny any appli-
cation to register securities, if upon examination into the affairs of the
issuer of such security it shall appear that:
[Vol. 15
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Prior to the Bill's amendment to this section, an issuer's registra-
tion of its securities could be denied or revoked pursuant to sub-section
(d) of section 517.111, if the issuer (or any controlling person of the
issuer) had made any fraudulent representation; 6 no provision existed
for patent non-disclosure. While arguably an issuer's non-disclosure
could have given rise to revocation or denial under another sub-section
of section 517.111, the amendment explicitly creates a separate ground
for material non-disclosure.87
Furthermore, the Bill amends section 517.111 to authorize the De-
partment to deny any request to terminate any securities registration or
withdraw any application for securities registration if the issuer has
committed any act that would be the ground for denial, suspension or
revocation of securities registration.88 The significance of this addition
lies in the extent of the examination the Department may make into
the affairs of an issuer that it believes has committed any such act.
Section 517.111(1) states, in part, that:
In making such examination, the department shall have access to
(a) The issuer is insolvent;
(b) The issuer or any controlling person has violated any provision of
this chapter or any rule made hereunder or any order of the department of
which such issuer has notice;
(c) The issuer or any controlling person has been or is engaged or is
about to engage in fraudulent transactions;
(d) The issuer or any controlling person is in any other way dishonest
or has made any fraudulent representations in any prospectus or in any
circular or other literature that has been distributed concerning the issuer
or its securities; or ....
FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1987) (amended 1990).
The Bill inserted "or failed to disclose any material information" in sub-section
(d) after the word representations. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 5.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 85. Arguably, sub-section (c) of Section 517.111 could pro-
vide the grounds for denial or revocation of securities registration because failing to
disclose material information has been held to be engaging in a fraudulent transaction.
See, e.g, S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (ruling that the failure to disclose material information in the sale
of securities is actionable under the antifraud provisions of section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, thereunder).
88. The Bill added sub-section 5 to section 517.111: "(5) The department may
deny any request to terminate any registration or to withdraw any application for regis-
tration if the department believes that an act which would be grounds for denial, sus-
pension, or revocation under this chapter has been committed." H.B. 3429, supra note
5, § 5.
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and may compel the production of all the books and papers of such
issuer and may administer oaths to and examine the officers of such
issuer or any other person connected therewith as to its business
and affairs and may also require a balance sheet exhibiting the as-
sets and liabilities of any such issuer or his income statement, or
both, to be certified to by a public accountant ... 89
This addition allows the Department to retain jurisdiction over is-
suers or registrants that it believes have committed a fraudulent act,
with the power to require production of documents and sworn testi-
mony. It also conforms the standard for denial or requests to terminate
or withdraw registration of securities to the standard that exists for
associated persons.90
2. Securities Professionals: Registration and Exemption
The Bill contains six significant changes regarding the registration
and exemption of securities professionals under the Florida Blue Sky
Law.
First, section 517.12 of the Act requires that all persons, dealers,
investment advisers and others that transact a securities or investment
advisory business to or from the state be registered with the Depart-
89. FLA. STAT. § 517.111(1) (1990).
90. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 6. "Associated person" means any
of the following:
(a) Any partner, officer, director, or branch manager of a dealer or invest-
ment adviser or any person occupying a similar status or performing simi-
lar functions;
(b) Any natural person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by
such dealer or investment adviser, other than an employee whose function
is only clerical or ministerial; or
(c) Any natural person, other than a dealer, employed, appointed, or au-
thorized by a dealer, or issuer to sell securities in any manner or act as an
investment adviser as defined in this section.
The partners of a partnership and the executive officers of a corporation or
other association registered as a dealer are not "associated persons" within
the meaning of this definition.
FLA. STAT. § 517.021(4) (1990).
Section 517.161(5) contains the following with respect to the revocation, denial or
suspension of registration of an associated person: "The department may deny any re-
quest to terminate or withdraw any application or registration if the department be-
lieves that an act which would be a ground for denial, suspension, restriction, or revoca-
tion under this chapter has been committed." FLA. STAT. § 517.161(5) (1990).
[Vol. 15
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ment unless otherwise exempt.91 It also contains the application proce-
dure and requirements for registration. 2
The Bill adds to subsection (1) of section 517.1293 the requirement
that the securities firm, for which any applicant for registration as an
associated person seeks to register, be a Florida registered dealer or
investment advisor.9 4 This provision ensures that an individual will not
be registered as an associated person of an unlicensed securities firm.95
Second, the Bill clarifies that associated persons must successfully
pass oral or written examinations to register under the Act, and codifies
the Department's "long held position" that principals, managers, super-
visors or persons exercising similar functions may be held to higher ex-
amination standards because of their responsibilities over the acts of
their associated persons.9" The Bill also clarifies that if the applicant
has passed certain tests prescribed by the Securities Exchange Act, the
Department shall waive its own requirements only if the federal exami-
nation is for a position that relates to the position to be filled by the
applicant. 7
91. FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (1990).
92. Id.
93. Subsection (1) of section 517.12 requires that persons selling securities in
Florida register under the Act. Prior to amendment by the Bill, it read:
(1) No dealer, associated person, or issuer of securities shall sell or offer
for sale any securities in or from offices in this state, or sell securities to
persons in this state from offices outside this state, by mail or otherwise,
unless the person has been registered with the department pursuant to the
provisions of this section.
FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (1987)(amended 1990).
94. The text of the language added to section 517.12(1) states: "The department
shall not register any person as an associated person of a dealer or investment adviser
unless the dealer or investment adviser with which the applicant seeks registration is
lawfully registered with the department pursuant to this chapter."
H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 6.
It is interesting to note that although in common parlance an investor's representa-
tive at the investor's brokerage firm is referred to as a "broker-dealer," actually (more
often than not) it is the corporate or partnership entity that employs those representa-
tives that is registered under the federal and state securities laws as a broker-dealer.
The human, individual representative employed by the broker-dealer firm is registered
under the securities laws as an "associated person" of that registered broker-dealer
firm.
95. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 6.
96. Id.
97. Id. As amended, section 517.12(8) states (with the Bill's amending language
in italics):
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Third, the Bill requires that every entity registered as a securities
dealer in the State of Florida also be registered as a broker or dealer
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and be
insured by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.98 As written
prior to amendment, section 517.12(16) allowed a Florida registered
broker-dealer's federal registration to lapse for a period of time prior to
the time at which the broker-dealer was required to renew its license in
Florida.
Fourth, to clarify its position that even though a broker-dealer
may effect transactions in securities that are exempt from registration
under the Act that broker-dealer is not always exempt from registra-
tion with the state. The legislature revised appropriate statutory cross
references in section 517.12(3). 9 Section 517.12(3) lists the instances
in which an, entity or individual may sell securities in an "exempt trans-
action"' 0 in Florida without registering as a securities professional.' 0'
The most well recognized "exempt transaction" is the private offering
The department may require the applicant of one or more principals or
general partners, or natural persons exercising similar functions, or any
associated person applicant to successfully pass oral or written examina-
tion. Because any principal, manager, supervisor, or person exercising
similar functions shall be responsible for the acts of the associated per-
sons affiliated with a dealer or investment adviser, the examination stan-
dards may be higher for a dealer, office manager, principal, or person exer-
cising similar functions than for a nonsupervisory associated person. The
department may waive the examination process when it determines that
such examinations are not in the public interest. The department shall
waive the examination requirements for any person who has passed any
tests as prescribed in s. 15(b)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
that relates to the position to be filled by the applicant.
FLA. STAT. § 517.12(8) (1990).
98. House Bill 3429 added the italicized language to section 517.12(16) of the
Act:
Except for securities dealers who are designated by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York as primary government securities dealers or securities
dealers registered as issuers of securities, every applicant for initial or re-
newal registration as a securities dealer and every person registered as a
securities dealer shall be registered as a broker or dealer with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission and shall be subject to insurance coverage
by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.
H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 6.
99. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 6.
100. Section 517.061 of the Act provides that the securities registration provi-
sions of the Act do not apply to sales or purchases of certain securitie:;.
101. FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (1990).
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exemption in which an issuer sells his own securities to no more than
35 non-accredited purchasers during a 12 month period." 2
Fifth, the Bill amends section 517.121 of the Act. Prior to the
amendment, subsection (1) of that section required any dealer, invest-
ment adviser, branch office or associated person registered with the De-
partment to maintain such books and records as required by rule. This
section further requires the Department to periodically examine these
books and records to determine if there is compliance.10 3
The Bill deleted the requirement that the dealer, investment ad-
viser, branch office or associated person be registered with the Depart-
ment. Thus, after amendment, a branch office that is not lawfully regis-
tered will not escape culpability for failure to maintain the required
books and records.0
The House of Representatives Committee on Commerce indicated
that this amendment served two purposes. First, it protects the public
by ensuring that securities professionals will keep proper records of
their transactions. And second, regulators will have additional evidence
of the transactions at unregistered branch offices to determine whether
violations have occurred at any such office. °5
Finally, section 517.161 of the Act was amended by the Bill. Sec-
tion 517.161 sets forth the grounds and procedures for revocation, de-
nial or suspension of registration of a dealer, investment advisor, associ-
ated person or branch office.' 06 Prior to amendment, subsection (4)
stated, inter alia:
It shall be sufficient cause for denial of an application or revocation
of registration in the case of a partnership, corporation, or unincor-
porated association, if any member of the partnership or any of-
ficer, director, or ultimate equitable owner . . . of the corporation
or association has been guilty of an act or omission which would be
cause for denying or revoking the registration of an individual
dealer, investment adviser, or associated person.107
102. Section 517.061(11) contains Florida's version of the "private placement"
exemption.
103. Prior to amendment, section 517.121(1) read: "A dealer, investment ad-
viser, branch office, or associated person registered under s. 517.12 shall maintain such
books and records as the department may prescribe by rule." FLA. STAT. § 517.121(1)
(1987)(amended 1990).
104. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 7.
105. Id.
106. FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (1990).
107. FLA. STAT. § 517.161(4) (1987) (amended 1990).
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The Bill provides that a securities firm's equitable. owner's mere
commission of, as opposed to a judgement or plea of guilty for, any act
or omission that would be cause for denying or revoking an individual's
registration is cause for the Department to deny or revoke the registra-
tion of the firm."0 8 This modification places the standard in agreement
with the other subsections of section 517.161.19
C: Definitional Changes and Clarifications
House Bill 3429 made a number of minor definitional changes and
108. As amended, section 517.161(4) reads, in part:
It shall be sufficient cause for denial of an application or revocation of
registration, in the case of a partnership, corporation, or unincorporated
association, if any member of the partnership or any officer, director, or
ultimate equitable owner of the corporation or association has committed
any act or omission which would be cause for denying, revoking, restrict-
ing, or suspending the registration of an individual dealer, investment ad-
viser, or associated person . ...
FLA. STAT. § 517.161(4) (1990).
The Bill also added a definition of "ultimate equitable owner" to section
517.161(4):
As used in this subsection, 'ultimate equitable owner' means a natural per-
son who directly or indirectly owns or controls an ownership interest in the
corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity however organ-
ized, regardless of whether such natural person owns or controls such own-
ership interest through one or more proxies, powers of attorney, nominees,
corporations, associations, partnerships, trusts, joint stock companies, or
other entities or devices, or any combination thereof.
FLA. STAT. § 517.161(4) (1990).
109. Section 517.161 provides, in part:
(1) Registration [of any dealer, investment adviser, associated person or
branch office] may be revoked, restricted, or suspended by the department
if the department determines that such applicant or registrant:
(a) Has violated any provision of this chapter or any rule or order made
under this chapter; (b) Has made a material false statement in the appli-
cation for registration; (c) Has been guilty of a fraudulent act in connec-
tion with any sale of securities, has been or is engaged or is about to en-
gage in making fictitious or pretended sales or purchases of any such
securities, or has been or is engaged or is about to engage in any practice
or sale of securities which is fraudulent or in violation of the law; (d) Has
made a misrepresentation or false statement to, or concealed any essential
or material fact from, any person in the sale of a security to such person;
FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1) (1990).
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modifications to clarify portions of the Act." 0
Section one of the Bill amends the definition section of the Act,
section 517.021, by deleting the definition of "accredited investor.""'
Section three of the Bill provides that "accredited investor" will be de-
fined by the Department in a rule that is in accordance with the corre-
sponding federal definition of that term."12 The Department has pro-
posed an amendment to the Florida Blue Sky Regulations to include a
definition of accredited investor that tracks the federal definition under
the Securities Act of 1933."1
The Bill also deletes the terms "broker," "agent" and "person"
and their accompanying definitions from section 517.021 of the Act." 4
The House Committee on Commerce offers no explanation for this
change. However, because prior to being deleted the definition of "bro-
110. The other changes made to the Act by House Bill 3429 are:
a. Section 3 of the Bill amended section 517.061 of the Act to include a reference
to "share exchanges" to reflect a recent amendment to the Florida General Corporation
Act;
b. Section 9 of the Bill deleted an obsolete date in section 517.131;
c. Section 10 of the Bill provided a necessary cross reference to the Open Govern-
ment Sunset Review Act in section 517.201(6) of the Act;
d. Section 11 of the Bill amended section 517.211(1) of the Act to provide a cross
reference to the Florida Statute section providing the legal rate of interest;
e. Section 12 of the Bill deleted an obsolete date in section 517.302 of the Act;
f. Section 14 of the Bill re-enacted Chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes as of
October 1, 1990; and
g. Section 15 of the Bill provides that Chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes will be
repealed on October 1, 2000, and shall be reviewed by the legislature pursuant to Sec-
tion 11.61 of the Florida Statutes.
111. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 1.
112. Id.
113. The "Florida Blue Sky Regulations" are the Rules of the Department, Divi-
sion of Securities. The Department's proposed amendment is to Rule 3E-200.001, the
definition section of the Regulations. The language of the proposed amendment is that
found in the definition of "accredited investor" in Rule 501 of the Rules and Regula-
tions of the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933
(found at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1990)).
The scant legislative history of the Bill provides no indication of why the legisla-
ture chose to delete the statutory definition and substitute a regulatory definition. How-
ever, if the legislature's intention was to place and keep the state's definition in step
with the federal definition, it is logically more appropriate for the term to be defined in
the Regulations than in the Statute. If the federal definition is amended in the future,
it will be less costly and time consuming for the Department to issue a new Rule than
for the legislature to amend the Chapter 517.
114. H.B. 3429, supra note 5, § 1.
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ker" referred to the definition of "dealer" and the definition of "agent"
referred to the definition of "associated person" in the Act, the legisla-
ture may have determined that these terms were superfluous.' 15
It is more curious that the legislative history of the Bill provides no
rationale for the legislature's decision to delete the term "person" and
its corresponding definition from the Act. The Florida Blue Sky Regu-
lations do not contain a definition of that term and the Department was
not directed to propose one. The term "person" is used numerous times
within other definitions in the Act and throughout the Act's substantive
provisions. 116 Determining the effect, if any, this deletion will have in
the future, is left to the future.
Section 517.051 of the Act enumerates the securities not subject to
the Act's registration requirements.1 7 These securities are exempted
from registration because they ordinarily are not susceptible to fraudu-
lent practices because the nature and character of the issuer, govern-
mental regulation on the issuer and the concomitant disclosure of finan-
cial information regarding the issuer, or because information about the
issuer is readily available in the marketplace." 8
Prior to the Bill's amendment, section 517.051 included as "ex-
empt securities," securities "issued by a corporation organized exclu-
sively for religious, educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or re-
formatory purposes and not for pecuniary profit.""19 The Bill amended
this language to provide that a corporation organized exclusively for
one of those enumerated purposes must also be operated for those pur-
poses in order for its issues to qualify for the exemption. 2
115. Furthermore, the Florida Blue Sky Regulations contain a number of situa-
tion-specific definitions of those terms. For example, Rule 3E-200.001(3) defines
"Agent of Issuer" and Rule 3E-200.001(10) defines "Broker/Dealer."
116. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 517.021(6) (1990) (definition of "dealer"); §
517.021(8) (definition of "guarantor"); § 517.021(10) (definition of "investment advi-
sor"); § 517.021(19) (definition of "promotor"). See also FLA. STAT. : 517.12 (1990)
(requiring "persons" to register as dealers, associated persons, investment advisors or
branch offices); FLA. STAT. § 517.211 (1990) (holding every "person" who violates cer-
tain provisions of the Act liable for damages).
117. FLA. STAT. § 517.051 (1990). Securities exempted by this section include
federal bonds, state bonds, insurance policies and annuity contracts. Id.
118. FINAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 5.
119. FLA. STAT. § 517.051(9) (1987) (amended 1990).
120. The amended text reads "securities issued by a corporation organized and
operated exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, fraternal, charitable, or re-
formatory purposes and not for pecuniary profit ..... FLA. STAT. § 517.051(9)
(1990).
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IV. Securities Industry Association v. Lewis: THE 1990
JUDICIAL CHANGES TO FLORIDA'S BLUE SKY LAW
A. Arbitration of Securities Law Disputes
The jurisprudence of arbitrating securities law disputes under fed-
eral law, prior to 1989, focused on the "anti-waiver" provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933121 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Ex-
change Act").122 These provisions nullify any condition or stipulation in
a securities transaction that binds any person to waive compliance with
any provision of the securities laws. 23 In 1953, in Wilko v. Swan,24
the United States Supreme Court considered the language, purposes
and legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933 and concluded that
a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate a claim under that act was void
pursuant to section 14 of the Securities Act. 125
The Wilko court understood its decision was a difficult one in view
of the competing legislative policies embodied in the Securities Act and
the United States Arbitration Act of 1925.126 The Court described the
Arbitration Act's policy, one that strongly favors the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate as a means of effecting a "prompt, economical
and adequate solution of controversies," as "not easily reconcilable"
with section 14 of the Securities Act.12 But the Wilko court reached
its holding based on its conviction that section 14 of the Securities Act
does not permit waiver of the right to select the judicial forum in favor
of arbitration because "arbitration lacks the certainty of a suit at law
under the [Securities] Act to enforce [the buyer's] rights.' 28 The
Court also was convinced that the Securities Act was intended to pro-
121. See supra note 18.
122. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 7811 (1990).
123. Section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933 states: "Any condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision of this title or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
15 U.S.C. § 77n (1990).
Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states: "Any condition, stip-
ulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this
title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required
thereby shall be void." 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1990).
124. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
125. Id. at 438.
126. See infra notes 158-184 and accompanying text.
127. 346 U.S. at 438.
128. Id. at 432.
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tect buyers of securities, who often do not deal at arm's length with
sellers, by offering them "a wider choice of courts and venue" than is
enjoyed by participants in other business transactions, making the
"right to select the judicial forum" a particularly valuable feature of
the Securities Act. 129
In 1985, the Supreme Court again wrestled with the competing
policies of the federal securities laws and the federal Arbitration Act.
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, a unanimous Court held that
the Arbitration Act requires federal courts, when faced with claims
that involve questions of federal securities law, state securities law or
common law, to sever or bifurcate the federal claims and compel arbi-
tration of all pendent state arbitrable issues when the parties had
agreed to arbitrate their dispute.'
Byrd inspired a profusion of comment and considerable litigation
in the lower federal courts.' 3 ' The Byrd decision indicated the Court's
maturing receptiveness to effectuate the policies underlying the Arbi-
tration Act, but it did not overrule Wilko. And, the question of whether
Wilko should be extended to predispute agreements to arbitrate claims
under the Exchange Act remained.
Two years later, the Supreme Court accepted the opportunity to
answer that question. In Shearson/American Express In,. v. McMa-
hon, the Court held that anti-fraud claims arising under the Exchange
Act are arbitrable pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement be-
tween a broker and a customer.3 2 The McMahon court recognized that
the Arbitration Act establishes a "federal policy favoring arbitration,
and stressed the statute's strong language, which declares, as a matter
of federal law, that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."'' 3 The Court concluded: "Thus, the
mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in
1953 is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has
129. Id. at 435.
130. 470 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1985).
13 1. See, e.g., Comment, Arbitrating Civil RICO and Implied Causes of Action
Arising Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 CATH. U.L.
REV. 455 (1987); see also Cane, supra note 40; notes 125-148 and accompanying text.
132. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The Court also held that federal civil RICO claims
are arbitrable pursuant to pre-dispute arbitration agreements betwe.en brokers and
their customers. Id.
133. Id. at 226-27 (citations omitted).
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prevailed since that time."' 34 The Court did not, however, overrule
Wilko v. Swan. Although the McMahon decision established the valid-
ity of arbitrating claims arising under the Exchange Act, claims arising
under the Securities Act remained non-arbitrable.
Three Justices dissented from the Court's holding in McMahon
that federal securities claims are arbitrable.'3 5 Justices Blackmun,
Brennan and Marshall did not deny the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion, but were concerned about protecting the investing public from ar-
bitrable forums controlled by the securities industry. Justice Blackmun
wrote:
Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 were enacted to protect investors from predatory behavior
of securities industry personnel. [T]he arbitral process at best
places the investor on an equal footing with the securities industry
personnel against whom the claims are brought. Compelling an in-
vestor to arbitrate securities claims puts him in a forum controlled
by the securities industry. This result directly contradicts the goal
of both securities Acts to free the investor from the control of the
market professional. 36
In 1989, the dissenting Justices in McMahon were presented with
another occasion to dissent on the issue of arbitrating federal securities
law claims when the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.' 31 In Rodriguez de Quijas, the
Court, through Justice Kennedy, expressly overruled Wilko v. Swan
and held that predispute arbitration agreements for claims arising
under the Securities Act are enforceable. 38
Justice Kennedy observed that the "Court's characterization of the
arbitration process in Wilko is pervaded by . . . 'the old judicial hostil-
ity to arbitration,' "39 and recognized the growing judicial deteriora-
tion of that view, culminating in the Court's decision in McMahon 40
134. Id. at 233.
135. Id. at 242.
136. Id. at 233, 260.
137. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall, joined this
time by Justice Stevens (the author of the dissenting opinion) dissented from the
Court's holding in Rodriguez de Quijas. Id. at 486.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 480 (citation omitted); see supra notes 124-129 and accompanying
text.
140. 490 U.S. at 480-81; see supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
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He asserted:
Once the outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceed-
ings is set to one side, it becomes clear that the right to select the
judicial forum and the wider choice of courts are not such essential
features of the Securities Act that § 14 is properly construed to bar
any waiver of these provisions. 4 '
The Court posited that there is no distinction between the "anti-
waiver" provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, 42 and
concluded that it "would be undesirable for the decisions in Wilko and
McMahon to continue to exist side by side."'143
The Court's decision in Rodriguez de Quijas was a logical exten-
sion of a previous disposition. In reversing Wilko, the Court again em-
phasized the compelling language of the Arbitration Act that declares,
as a matter of federal law, a policy favoring arbitration of disputes.14
The majority did not address, however, the concerns raised by the dis-
sent in McMahon, and the question of what arbitration forum (as op-
posed to any arbitration forum) was not before the Court.' 4
B. Section 8 of House Bill 3429
Section 8 of House Bill 3429146 modified the text of Florida Stat-
utes section 517.122, the Act's provision regarding the arbitration of
disputes between securities professionals and their customers, by, inter
alia, replacing the word "may" with the word "shall.' 141 As amended
by the Bill, section 517.122 stated:
Arbitration. Any agreement to provide services that are covered by
this chapter, entered into after October 1, 1990, by a person re-
quired to register under this chapter, for arbitration of disputes
arising under the agreement shall provide to an aggrieved party the
141. 490 U.S. at 481.
142. See supra note 123.
143. 490 U.S. at 484.
144. 490 U.S. at 477; see supra notes 133 and 134 and accompanying text.
145. The dissent in Rodriguez de Quijas did not raise the same concerns prof-
fered by the dissent in McMahon. The dissent in Rodriguez de Quijas argued that
stare decisis prohibited the Court from overruling Wilko. 490 U.S. at 487.
146. H.B. 3429, 11th Leg. (1990).
147. H.B. 3429, supra note 146, § 8. For the text of section 517.122 before and
after amendment by the Bill, see supra notes 10 and 11, respectively.
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option of having arbitration before and pursuant to the rules of the
American Arbitration Association or other independent nonindus-
try arbitration forum as well as any industry forum.1 48
The House Commerce Committee's Final Staff Analysis is silent
on why the legislature chose to change the permissive to the
mandatory. However, the Task Force Report had proposed making this
change when the Act was last amended in 1986.149 The Task Force
Report originally proposed the change to ameliorate the perception
among investors that their only redress through arbitration was in a
forum sponsored and controlled by the securities industry.150 These
were the same concerns voiced in the dissent in McMahon.15'
The Task Force Report indicated an apprehension on the part of
the investing public that customers who had entered into predispute
arbitration agreements with their brokers and who submitted to arbi-
tration thereunder had not been given fair hearings before the industry
panels. 152 The Task Force Report continues:
It was the finding of this Task Force that the current provisions
contained in brokerage agreements often limit the choice of arbi-
tration panels to groups that are associated with the securities in-
dustry. Although there was no evidence presented that would jus-
tify concern with the impartiality of these mediators, it was the
Task Force's determination that an expanded selection of arbitra-
tion groups would strengthen the arbitration process through diver-
sification. There is a need for at least one additional arbitration
source in brokerage contracts that is sponsored by other than an
industry self-regulatory organization [such as the NASD] .15
In 1990, the Florida Legislature amended section 517.122 of the
Act and sounded a death knell to those concerns. The legislature, how-
ever, should have sent to know for whom the bell tolls. Two days after
the October 1, 1990 effective date of Chapter 517, the death knell
sounded again. This time the bell tolled for section 517.122. On Octo-
ber 3, 1990, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida summarily quieted that nascent arbitration provision, hold-
148. FLA. STAT. § 517.122 (1990); see also supra notes 10 and 11.
149. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 55.
150. Id. at 54.
151. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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ing it unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, preempted by the United States Arbitration
Act.154
C. Supremacy; Preemption and the Federal Arbitration Act
The Supremacy Clause of article VI of the United States Consti-
tution prevents the states from trespassing on federal law and policy. 1' 55
Preemption is the vehicle by which the Supremacy Clause is en-
forced.' 56 State laws are preempted by federal laws when the state law
actually conflicts with a federal law and when the state law encroaches
upon an area in which Congress intended its enactment to occupy the
given area to the exclusion of state law.157
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)' mandates that courts en-
force arbitration agreements and recognizes arbitration as a valid form
of dispute resolution. It does not contain, however, an express preemp-
tive provision.159
The FAA was designed "to overrule the judiciary's long-standing
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate"'I6 and to place such agree-
ments "upon the same footing as other contracts."'' The Supreme
Court has postulated that although Congress undoubtedly was aware
that the FAA would encourage the expeditious resolution of disputes,
its passage "was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional de-
sire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered."'1 62
154. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
155. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117 (Ist'Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
156. Id.
157. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988); see also Jen-
nings, Arizona Corporation Commission v. Media Products, Inc.: Clarification of
Competing Federal and State Securities Regulation, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 449 (1989)
(providing an interesting discussion, analysis and explanation of the coexistence of fed-
eral and state securities laws that offers an understanding of the unresolved and re-
solved constitutional issues of the dual system of regulation).
158. United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1989).
159. Id.; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (upholding
application of state arbitration law to arbitration provision in contract not covered by
the FAA).
160. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
161. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)).
162. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220.
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The Court has recognized that the FAA does not require parties to
arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so,' 6' and it does not prevent
parties who do agree to arbitrate from excluding certain claims from
the scope of their arbitration agreement."" It merely requires courts to
enforce negotiated agreements to arbitrate according to their terms. 6 5
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that Congress did not
intend the FAA to occupy the entire field of arbitration law. 6 6 The
Court has held that the FAA did not preempt a California law that
permits courts to stay arbitration proceedings pending resolution of re-
lated litigation involving third parties not bound by the arbitration
agreement when the parties contracted to abide by the state rules of
arbitration. 67
In striking down a section of the California Labor Code in Perry v.
Thomas, the Supreme Court reasoned that in enacting the FAA, "Con-
gress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitra-
tion."' 68 It continued: "Congress intended to foreclose state legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements
... . We see nothing in the [FAA] indicating the broad principle of
enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under state
law., 6 9
Although the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the inten-
tion of the FAA was to mandate the enforceability of contractually
valid arbitration agreements, thereby proscribing a state from legisla-
tively or judicially requiring a judicial forum after the parties to the
arbitration contract have agreed otherwise,170 some lower federal courts
have interpreted the FAA and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it
to be hegemonic, prohibiting all state action with respect to arbitration
contracts.
163. See id. at 219.
164. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
165. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
166. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; see also Volt Information Sci-
ences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
167. See Volt, 489 U.S. 468.
168. 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
10 (1984)).
169. Id. at 489-90 (quoting Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11, 16).
170. Id.
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For example, in Securities Industry Association v. Connolly, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the FAA
preempts the enforceability of a Massachusetts securities regulation.171
The regulation at issue barred securities firms from requiring individu-
als to enter into predispute arbitration agreements as a nonnegotiable
condition to opening a brokerage account, ordered that the prohibition
be brought conspicuously to the attention of the prospective customers
and required the brokerage firm to make a written disclosure of the
legal effect of the agreement.'72
The Connolly court reviewed the language of the FAA and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of both the language and the legislative
history of the FAA. 173 It seemingly relied heavily on dicta from Mc-
Mahon that "courts must be on guard for artifices in which the ancient
suspicion of arbitration might reappear,' 1 74 in holding that "no state
may simply subject arbitration to individualized regulation in the same
manner as it might subject some other unprotected contractual
device."15
The First Circuit also placed great emphasis, out of context, on a
statement from Perry v. Thomas.76 The parties in Perry were a bro-
kerage firm and one of its former employees who had signed an agree-
ment to arbitrate any dispute arising out of the employment relation-
ship. 7 7 One issue in the case was whether the provision of the
California Labor Code that provided wage collection actions may be
maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to
arbitrate was valid in face of the FAA. 78
The Supreme Court noted that section 2 of the FAA governs situ-
ations, such as this one, in which determining the enforceability of an
executed arbitration agreement requires choosing between a state law
and the FAA. 179 The Court opined that an agreement to arbitrate is
valid, irrevocable and enforceable, as a matter of federal law, "save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
171. 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
172. Id. at 1117.
173. Id. at 1117-20.
174. Id. at 1119 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. at 226).
175. Id. at 1120.
176. 482 U.S. 483.
177. Id. at 485.
178. Id. at 486.
179. Id. at 492. The Court was not addressing the issue of contract formation.
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contract."' 0 The Supreme Court continued:
Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applica-
ble if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revo-
cability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law prin-
ciple that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract
to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of §
2. A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to en-
force an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a man-
ner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitra-
tion agreements under state law.l 8'
The issue in Perry and the Supreme Court's broad statements re-
garding section 2 of the FAA dealt directly with the heart of the FAA
and the legislative intent underlying it: States cannot, legislatively or
judicially, deny persons the right to arbitrate disputes after those per-
sons voluntarily have entered into a contract to do so.'8 2 The court in
Perry was not faced with the issue of whether, for the welfare of the
investing public, a state securities regulatory body could prohibit bro-
kerage firms from requiring individuals to enter into predispute arbitra-
tion agreements as a condition precedent to opening an account or re-
quire the firm to disclose to potential investors the legal consequences
of such a clause in the brokerage agreement the prospective customer
was signing.183
The Connolly court lifted, out of context, the Supreme Court's
statement that a "state law principle that takes its meaning precisely
180. Id. at 492 n.9 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1989). Section 2 of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, trans-
action, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1989).
181. Perry, 482 U.S. 492 n.9 (citation omitted).
182. See supra, notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
183. See supra, note 172 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the first proposed
regulation appears inhospitable to arbitration. However, it does not affect the "validity,
irrevocability, or enforceability" of an arbitration agreement. It merely prohibits a bro-
kerage firm from requiring its potential customers from involuntarily entering into a
contract. See McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
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from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport
with the [equality requirement] of § 2," applied it to a different issue
and found the proposed regulations unconstitutional."" Connolly's ap-
plication of Perry to its issue and facts was unfounded and
unnecessary.
D. Supposition: The Demise of Section 8
The Connolly court was not alone in making an unwarranted con-
clusion during its foray into Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in
Securities Industry Association v. Lewis,185 following Connolly's wan-
ton lead, made the same suppositions about the FAA and the judicial
gloss painted thereon, and summarily held that section 8 of the Bill was
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause, preempted by the
FAA.186
Prior to section 8's amendment to section 517.122 of the Act, an
arbitration agreement between a securities brokerage firm and its cus-
tomer could contain a provision allowing the parties the option of arbi-
trating any dispute arising thereunder before and pursuant to the rules
of the American Arbitration Association."'1 The amending language of
184. See Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S at 493). Addition-
ally, the appeals court in Connolly found no merit to Connolly's argument that Massa-
chusetts treats arbitration agreements like other contracts between businesses and con-
sumers- it regulates them as extensively as necessary for the public welfare. It stated:
"In our view, that self-congratulatory casuistry will not wash. Indeed, we think that it
was precisely this sort of categorization error which Congress sought to cure when it
enacted the FAA." Id. at 1120.
185. 751 F. Supp. 205. Gerald Lewis was named the defendant tn this action in
his official capacity as the Comptroller of the State of Florida and head of the Depart-
ment. Mr. Lewis is empowered to act as the senior executive in charge of the Depart-
ment for the state, including the Division of Securities and Investor Protection. In that
capacity, he is responsible for administering and enforcing the securities laws of Flor-
ida. FLA. STAT. § 517.03 (1990).
186. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205. The issue was before the court on the plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment. In addition to the Securities Industry Association, the
plaintiffs in this action were Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jen-
rette Securities Corporation, Raymond James & Associates, Inc., Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., PaineWebber Incorporated, Prudential-Bache Securities
Inc., Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc. and Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.,
Incorporated.
187. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The American Arbitration Asso-
ciation is an independent, non-securities industry controlled, arbitration association.
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section 8 required that such agreements contain that option.'88
The plaintiffs in Lewis regularly transact securities brokerage
businesses in the State of Florida and do not include in their arbitration
agreements with their customers a provision for arbitration before the
American Arbitration Association or other independent, nonindustry
arbitration forum. 18 9 Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of sec-
tion 517.122 of Chapter 517 alleging that it conflicted with the FAA
and, therefore, violated the Supremacy Clause. 90
Citing Perry v. Thomas,'9' the plaintiffs argued that "[s]tate laws
that stand as obstacles to the parties' freedom to privately negotiate
arbitration agreements are . . . preempted by the [FAA], and invalid
under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2."191 In addition,
the plaintiffs relied substantially on Connolly9 3 for the same assertion.
The North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.
filed an amicus curiae brief in Lewis.' 94 NASAA argued that Connolly
was contrary to binding precedent from the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit. 95
In Eassa Properties v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that "[this court] has adhered to the FAA's distinction
between contract formation and contract enforcement even though the
188. See supra note I1 and accompanying text.
189. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. at 206.
190. Id.
191. 482 U.S. 483.
192. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 8, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla.
1990)(No. 90 Civ. 1934). The plaintiffs also cited general propositions of law on the
validity of state arbitration laws from a number of equally inapposite cases to support
their conclusion: Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ("The preeminent
concern of Congress in passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements into
which parties had entered. . . ."); Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. City of Huntsville, 748 F.2d
573 (11th Cir. 1984) (Alabama law that predispute arbitration agreements were void
ab initio preempted by the FAA); Oppenheimer & Co. v.-Young, 475 So. 2d 221 (Fla.
1985) (provision of Florida Blue Sky Law, FLA. STAT. § 517.241 (3), precluding en-
forcement of predispute arbitration agreements concerning securities transactions, pre-
empted by the Act).
193. 883 F.2d 1114.
194. The North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA)
is an organization of securities administrators from the many states and Canadian
provinces. See Loss, supra note 3, at 8.
195. Brief for North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., ami-
cus curiae at 6-8, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Lewis, 751 F. Supp 205 (S.D. Fla.
1990)(No. 90 Civ. 1934) [hereinafter NASAA Brief].
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state rule of formation singled out arbitration clauses for somewhat less
favorable treatment."' 9 NASAA therefore argued that while federal
law may govern the interpretation and enforcement of a valid arbitra-
tion agreement, state law governs the question of whether such an
agreement exists at all.'97
The Lewis court dismissed NASSA's contention that Eassa
Properties was controlling'9 8 and adopted plaintiffs' arguments. The
court held that "a state law that singles out arbitration agreements, as
does the amended version of [section] 517.122, conflicts with section 2
of the FAA."' 99
The plaintiffs in Lewis also contested section 517.122 on the
ground that it was preempted by section 5 of the FAA.210 Section 5 of
the FAA states in part that "[i]f in the agreement provision be made
for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an
umpire, such method shall be followed." 0'
196. 851 F.2d 1301, 1304 n.7 (11th Cir. 1988). The position of the Eleventh
Circuit is consistent with language from the Supreme Court in Perry. See Perry, 482
U.S. at 491 n.8; see also Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (1lth Cir. 1985) (appli-
cability of the general provisions of state contract law to the determination of the mak-
ing of an arbitration agreement does not contravene the FAA or its underlying policy).
197. NASAA Brief, supra note 195, at 7.
198. The court in Eassa Properties upheld a provision of the Florida Uniform
Partnership Act that required all partners to agree to submit a claim or liability to
arbitration for the arbitration agreement to be valid. See Eassa Propertes, 851 F.2d at
1304. The Lewis court maintained that Eassa was distinguishable because it involved
an issue of state law that was applicable not only to arbitration agreements. See Lewis,
751 F. Supp. at 208.
199. Id.
200. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 15, Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (No. 90 Civ.
1934) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memo].
201. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1989). Section 5 states:
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of namirg or ap-
pointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be
followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be provided
and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or it for
any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or
arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of
either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act
under he said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they
had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the
agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.
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The plaintiffs contended that section 5 of the FAA "reflects a de-
termination by Congress that contracting parties' voluntary choice of
an arbitrator, or their choice of an arbitral forum, should govern and
should not be displaced by state statutes or regulations. '02 The second
time the trial court heard McMahon v. Shearson/Express, Inc.,203 it
opined that the Supreme Court's mandate to rigorously enforce arbitra-
tion agreements:
demands respect for a forum selection method voluntarily adopted
by the parties, which should be given specific enforcement. . . The
method agreed upon by the parties for naming an arbitrator is ex-
plicit and unambiguous and therefore must be given controlling ef-
fect. We have no power to change any of the terms of the
agreement. 204
The plaintiffs in Lewis relied on this language and argued that
securities brokers and their customers are "expressly entitled under sec-
tion 5 of the [FAA] to select the . . . arbitrable forums before whom
they will resolve their disputes. The compulsory forum provision [of
section 517.122] seeks to interfere with these voluntary choices."205
Although the court in McMahon II obviously was speaking of ju-
dicial modification of existing arbitration agreements, Lewis did not
question or consider the potentially spurious logic of applying that
holding to an issue dealing with the formation, as opposed to the en-
forcement, of an agreement to arbitrate disputes. Furthermore, the
court failed to address the Eleventh Circuit's position, most recently
expressed in Eassa Properties, that it adheres to the FAA's distinction
between contract formation and contract enforcement even though the
state rule of formation singles out arbitration clauses for somewhat less
favorable treatment.20 6 Again, the Lewis court agreed with the plain-
tiffs' argument and held that section 517.122 was unconstitutional, pre-
202. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 200, at 15-16.
203. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 369
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 896 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1990) [herein-
after McMahon I]. In McMahon II, the district court was asked to compel arbitration
under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. That request was made by the bro-
ker after the case was remanded to the district court following the Supreme Court's
decision upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the Exchange
Act. See supra, note 132 and accompanying text.
204. McMahon II, 709 F. Supp. at 373.
205. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 200, at 17-18.
206. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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empted under the Supremacy Clause by the FAA.207
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida attributed a hegemonic deference to the Federal Arbitration Act
that was unnecessary based on the FAA, the legislative intent support-
ing the FAA, and the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence of
that act and its legislative history. The Department chose not to send to
know for whom the bell tolls; it did not appeal the Lewis decision.
Whether the concerns of the dissenting Justices in McMahon2 08 are
valid and whether they ever can and ever will be resolved remain unan-
swered questions. 0 9
207. Lewis, 751 F. Supp. at 208.
208. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
209. The issue is not dead, however. On January 31, 1990, The Honorable John
D. Dingall, Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives, posted a letter to The Honorable Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller
General of the United States, in which Representative Dingall asked the General Ac-
counting Office to prepare a comprehensive study of securities industry practices with
respect to predispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements and of the arbitration
process as sponsored by the securities industry self-regulatory organizations.
Interestingly, on March 5, 1991, the Wall Street Journal ran an article entitled
"Brokerage Firms Drop Opposition to Arbitration." The article not only is germane to
this article, it also may provide some insight into the reasons for the Securities Industry
Association's energetic attempt to gain the ruling it did in Lewis. The article reports:
[I]n.a major shift, several big brokerage firms have embraced the indepen-
dent American Arbitration Association as an alternative to industry-spon-
sored forums for settling some investor disputes. The firms . . . -agreed to
participate in a pilot program that would allow customers to bring disputes
before the [American Arbitration Association] even when their brokerage
agreements restrict them to industry-sponsored arbitration forums.
The pilot program is a response to pressure from the Securities and
Exchange Commission, which a year ago strongly urged the securities in-
dustry to adopt a rule allowing investors a choice in arbitration forums.
The SEC believes giving customers such flexibility would allay concerns
that arbitration stacks the deck against small investors, which tl'e securi-
ties industry has long denied.
The [American Arbitration Association] is a major independent fo-
rum that is privately funded and widely perceived to be more sympathetic
to investors. Investors win about 60% of the time at the [American Arbi-
tration Association], compared with about half of the time at industry-
sponsored forums.
But brokerage firms have long had problems with the [American Ar-
bitration Association]. For one thing, it is more expensive than industry-
sponsored forums.
Dean Witter and PaineWebber will be reluctant to allow investors to
[Vol. 15
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V. CONCLUSION
House Bill 3429, enacted as Chapter 517 of the Florida Statutes,
made broadly based revisions to the Florida Blue Sky Law. It rein-
forced the goal of its predecessors by adding a number of provisions
that deny issuers or securities professionals the benefits of exemption
from registration, the opportunity to register when required to do so to
offer or trade in securities, and the ability to withdraw from registra-
tion if those individuals have committed any fraudulent act in connec-
tion with a securities transaction. The addition of these prohibitions
should increase the Department's ability to effectuate the legislature's
enunciated purpose of protecting Florida residents from investment
scams and other fraudulent activity in connection with the purchase
and sale of securities.21°
The Bill reduced the number of securities that will be subject to
Chapter 517's laborious merit review process and it gave the Depart-
ment additional rule making authority. These modifications will pro-
mote economy in transactions involving securities in Florida and in reg-
ulating those transactions.
Finally, the Bill added the short-lived section 8 to the Act. The
Lewis court had at its disposal a plethora of binding precedent and
persuasive authority in deciding whether to uphold or strike down the
prescription that arbitration agreements between Florida-registered
broker-dealers and their customers grant the customer the option of
arbitrating before a non-securities industry controlled forum. Based on
the jurisprudence of the Federal Arbitration Act and its potential he-
gemony over state laws affecting arbitration, the court's decision was
not capricious, but it was not compelled. And the final bell has yet to
toll.211
use the [American Arbitration Association] in some jurisdictions, such as
Florida and California, where they perceive lessened chances of winning.
Siconolfi, Brokerage Firms Drop Opposition to Arbitration, Wall St. J., March 5,
1991, at Cl, col. 3 and C21, col. 3.
210. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 209.
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